That really is the million-dollar question. From the outside it feels paradoxical: record scandals, major governance failures, inequality and frustration — yet no mass overthrow or even a serious challenge to the ruling party.
But if we piece together the dynamics (from political science, survey data, and recent Greek experience), it makes sense why Greeks tolerate Mitsotakis’s government despite the anger:
- After the trauma of 2010–2018 bailouts and 2015 brinkmanship, many Greeks prioritise stability over radical change.
- Even if inequality is high and wages stagnate, the absence of looming bankruptcy, capital controls, or Troika diktats feels like relief compared to the chaos of the past.
- People fear that upheaval (strikes, mass protest, euro-exit talk) could “re-traumatise” the economy.
- SYRIZA collapsed as a credible anti-systemic force after 2015–2019; Tsipras’s compromises destroyed its “radical hope.”
- PASOK/KINAL remains small, fragmented, and often perceived as compromised by its bailout past.
- Far-right groups gain some protest votes, but they don’t mobilize a broad coalition.
- Result: many who are angry simply see no alternative government to rally behind.
- Greece ranks last in EU press freedom (RSF); most mainstream TV and newspapers are owned by oligarchic interests aligned with the government.
- Scandals (Predator spyware, Tempi train crash, police repression) are often downplayed, reframed, or buried.
- Without sustained coverage, scandals lose mobilizing power.
- After a decade of austerity and protest waves (2010–2015), there’s a collective fatigue: “We tried, nothing changed.”
- Hundreds of thousands of young, educated Greeks emigrated. The demographic left behind is older, more risk-averse, less likely to revolt.
- Protest capacity is therefore weaker than the anger levels would suggest.
- Police repression, surveillance scandals, SLAPP lawsuits, and harsh treatment of demonstrations create a sense that protesting is costly and often futile.
- People compare the risks (police violence, job consequences, legal trouble) with the potential gains (unlikely regime collapse) and often conclude it isn’t worth it.
- A portion of the electorate benefits from state jobs, contracts, or favors, reinforcing passivity.
- Many Greeks have internalised low expectations of the state — they don’t expect competence in fires, floods, or snow, so failures don’t always translate into revolutionary anger.
- Greece still has regular elections, and ND continues to win comfortably. Even angry citizens may feel they’ve “done their part” by voting — and then resign themselves to waiting until the next ballot.
- Turnout has fallen, but apathy helps incumbents, because non-participation = status quo advantage.
Greeks are angry, but fear, fatigue, fragmented opposition, media control, repression, and lack of hope in alternatives mean that anger doesn’t convert into overthrow. Instead, it translates into apathy, small protests, or emigration.
Would you like me to show opinion polls since 2019 (trust in government, institutions, protest willingness) so you can see in numbers how resignation has replaced mobilization?